The current issue of Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric is devoted to philosophical reflections on language. The collected papers present a wide spectrum of philosophical investigations into different areas of language study, including grammar, semantics, argumentation, legal language, and also a discussion of the categorial analysis of logic as applied to questions of identity of thought and being.
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Wolfram Hinzen discusses the grammar of referential dependence. He observes that reference is commonly taken to be a 'word-world' (or 'semantic') relation, contrasting with anaphora as a 'word-word' (or 'syntactic') relation. Against this dichotomy, however, stands evidence that the particular forms of reference that exist in human language are all regulated grammatically. Hinzen demonstrates that reference is a grammatical phenomenon, and it is never determined lexically; furthermore he provides evidence that, beyond a grammatical theory of reference governing the specific range of ways in which words can be related to the world in language, no further special principles of a narrow syntactic sort are required for another relation, which has been called 'word-word'. The grammar that regulates object reference naturally extends to a grammar of referential dependence, including a form of 'identity'. Hinzen's conclusions lead to a considerable reformulation of Minimalist accounts of syntax and architecture of language faculty.
Tadeusz Ciecierski provides an overview of the linguistic approach to intentionality. He observes that this approach embraces theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. Ciecierski demonstrates, however, that the linguistic view of intentionality seems to be cir-Piotr Stalmaszczyk cular and explanatorily futile (the criteria in question fail to distinguish the relevant class), which strongly suggests that it might be better to approach the concept of the intentional state in a more direct, and to a large extent non-linguistic, manner. According to Ciecierski such a different approach would combine semantic studies with ontological, methodological and formal considerations, as well as with inquiries into philosophical interpretations of empirical results. The author also suggests that instead of following the linguistic view it seems more theoretically desirable to investigate the extra-linguistic criteria of the intentional, criteria that explicitly make use of notions such as aboutness, content, direction of fit, Meinongian incompleteness, encoding-exemplifying distinction, intentional explanation or intentional circularity.
Katarzyna Kijania-Placek offers an analysis of indexical expressions and proper names used in proverbs. As the author observes, both indexicals and proper names contribute properties rather than objects to the propositions expressed when they are used in sentences interpreted as proverbs. According to the presented proposal, their contribution is accounted for by the mechanism of descriptive anaphora. Indexicals with rich linguistic meaning, such as 'I', 'you', or 'today', turn out to be cases of the attributive uses of indexicals, i.e. uses whose contribution relies on the linguistic meaning of the word. On the other hand, third person pronouns, names of locations as well as surnames are analyzed as non-attributive descriptive uses.
Two papers focus on predicates of taste (such as 'tasty', 'disgusting', 'astonishing', 'boring', 'cool', etc.) and disagreement. Dan Zeman observes that disagreement has played an important role in the current debate about the semantics of predicates of taste. Specifically, the intuition of disagreement has been used by certain parties to the debate (contextualists and relativists) to argue against their opponents by showing that they cannot account for this intuition and thus that they are incomplete. Relativists, in particular, have used this objection against the major competitor of their view, contextualism. However, Zeman concentrates in his contribution entirely on ability of the said trend in itself to provide a full answer to the challenge.
Natalia Karczewska views disagreement about taste as disagreement about the discourse, and analyzes metalinguistic negotiations about taste (predominantly within the framework of contextualism). She argues that even though the metalinguistic strategies provide a valuable insight into the ways the appearance of disagreement is produced, they are not entirely successful when it comes to accounting for faultless disagreement in the matters of taste.
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The next contribution, by David Botting, moves from the topic of disagreement to that of confirmation. Botting discusses the relation between high confirmation and inductive validity. He argues that this relation depends on the kind of question to which the argument is meant to be providing an answer, and stresses that we should distinguish inductive generalization from inductive extrapolation even in cases where they might appear to have the same answer, and also from confirmation of a hypothesis.
Miguel López-Astorga investigates selected problems of the mental logic with the double negation, and argues for the necessity of a semantic approach. He observes that the double negation has always been carefully analyzed by different logical systems, from ancient times to the present. It is on of the issues that the current syntactic theories studying human reasoning, such as the mental logic theory, address today. López-Astorga claims that, in the case of some languages (such as Spanish), the double negation causes problems for the cognitive theories based mainly on formal schemata and supporting the idea of a universal syntax of thought in the human mind. Hence, he proposes that semantic frameworks such as that of the mental models theory seem to be to be compatible with the different grammatical particularities of every language, and therefore they are more appropriate for explaining the human inferential activity.
Paweł Grabarczyk discusses the notion of 'narrow content'. His contribution traces how the disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning (i.e. Fregean 'sense') led to the shift towards a new, technical term of 'narrow content'. Grabarczyk mentions two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion -the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between mental and linguistic narrow content. He argues that the most controversial combination of both distinctions is the idea of functional linguistic narrow content. Nevertheless this controversial notion of narrow content sheds some much needed light on several key semantic phenomena which might otherwise be difficult to explain, hence narrow content can be seen as a rightful descendant of the notion of meaning.
Justyna Grudzińska discusses semantics with dependent types for indefinites. She proposes a new semantics with dependent types for indefinites, encompassing both the data related to their exceptional scopal behavior, and the data related to their anaphoric (dynamic) properties. The proposal builds on the formal system combining generalized quantifiers with dependent types. The general/specific ambiguity in indefinites has been tied to the variability in type assignment and related in a uniform manner to the systematic dichotomy running through their scopal and dynamic behavior.
Ilya Egorychev offers a categorial rendition of the Parmenidian thesis on the identity of thought and being. He remarks that the classic understanding of logic as an instrument of cognition gives rise to the fundamental mapping problem of reconciliation of this reality with any possible practices of its representations in thought. In other words, it is essentially not the same thing that can be thought and that can be. And only thanks to relatively recent formal theoretical results it became possible to study logic not as an arbitrary instrument of knowledge, but rather as a special case of some abstract topological construction, and thereby as an aspect of reality itself. These results were obtained in the sixties of the last century mostly by the great French mathematician Alexander Grothendieck (1928 Grothendieck ( -2014 who introduced radically new foundations for algebraic geometry, formulated in the language of category theory. Egorychev concludes that after the highly abstract and essentially geometric Grothendieck constructions gave rise to so called categorial analysis of logic, it became possible to show that Parmenides was right after all, and that the Parmenidian equivalence may be completely categorically justified: a world is thinkable if and only if a world is real.
The two final contributions are concerned with legal language and theory of law. Marta Andruszkiewicz analyzes selected aspects of the linguistic theory of law. Her main aim is to discuss the range of applicability of philosophical and linguistic conceptions in theory of law. She observes that law theory often reflects certain movements and controversies that have been significant in linguistic sciences, such as, for example, structuralism, formal languages theories, transformational-generative theories, pragmalinguistics. Andruszkiewicz claims that the methodology of formal language study is only applicable in the analysis of some issues within the language of the law. These methods may prove insufficient to fully grasp the importance of semantic and pragmatic aspects of the language of law. Research on the language of law could be supported not only by the methodology stemming from the science of language or linguistics, but also from the broadly understood sciences focusing on language and literature, including literary theory, cognitive metaphor theory, and anthropology.
Finally, Katarzyna Doliwa looks at the philosophical and linguistic sources of Herbert L. A. Hart's theory of law. Herbert Hart (1907 Hart ( -1992 was a British legal philosopher, influenced, by, among others, John Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Doliwa traces the philosophical and also linguistic sources of Hart's theory of law, stressing the importance of ordinary language in his own philosophy.
